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ABSTRACT This article describes the transformations of the state in Mauritania in 2003–2011
in terms of the concrete practices of economic policy management. It questions the relationship
to the state in a context of massive informality and where circumvention of the rules and
misappropriation are major political repertoires. Nevertheless, my observations suggest that
it is useful to study the rules and formal procedures in concrete terms in order to decode the
way that they structure power relations in Mauritania, and that this analysis can be used to
investigate the transformations of the state. I propose a reinterpretation of Mauritania’s
political trajectory seen through the prism of the concrete practices of economic
management. This reveals that, despite major deception in relation to macroeconomic
ﬁgures revealed in 2005, technocratic activity continued in an “ocean of transgression”.
RÉSUMÉ Cet article rend compte des transformations de l’Etat enMauritanie entre 2003 et 2011
par le biais des pratiques concrètes de la gestion des politiques économiques. Il questionne le
rapport à l’Etat dans un contexte où l’informalité est massive et où le contournement des
règles et l’arnaque sont des répertoires politiques majeurs. Néanmoins, mon constat indique
qu’il est intéressant de décrypter la manière dont les règles et procédures formelles, étudiées
au concret, structurent les rapports de pouvoir en Mauritanie, et que cette analyse peut servir à
interroger les transformations de l’Etat. Je propose une relecture de la trajectoire politique
nationale au prisme des pratiques concrètes de gestion de l’économie. Il en ressort que, même
lors des importants mensonges sur les chiffres macroéconomiques, dévoilés en 2005, l’action
technocratique a pu se maintenir dans un « océan de transgression ».
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Introduction
In September 2004, the new governor of the Central Bank of Mauritania ﬂew to Washington DC
with a tough mission to complete. He had to confess to the World Bank and IMF ofﬁcials that a
massive statistical lie had taken place in Mauritania in the past few years. He had the president’s
approval to do so; Maaouya Ould Taya was losing his control over the administration as well as
the economic and ﬁnancial elite. Large amounts were spent off-budget and the foreign currencies
reserves of the Central Bank were looted. After this “misreporting”, the country underwent inter-
national sanctions; it had to launch a large process of reform and revision of all macroeconomic
data, and a whole new national economic history emerged (Islamic Republic of Mauritania 2006).
But despite this reformist strategy, Mauritania was entering a long period of instability. Taya was
overthrown from power in August 2005 after heading the state for more than 20 years; his regime
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was followed by a transition (2005–2007), a democratic election (April 2007), a new coup d’état
in 2008, a rectiﬁcation period (2008–2009) and again a so-called democratic period (2010–). In
this trajectory, instability, power struggles and the use of formal administrative and reformist prac-
tices are closely intertwined.
Drawing on the Mauritanian situation, I argue that analysing formal economic procedures and
calculation practices helps us understand the way power is exercised, even in a context of massive
informality and fraud.1 In the Report on the Revision of Macroeconomic Data 1992–2004, not only
did the government admit to faking its economic statistics over some 12 years, it also stated that
during that period “macroeconomic management became increasingly inappropriate to the real situ-
ation, often with the advice of partners who had been misled, leading to the taking of measures that
fostered imbalances instead of combating them” (Islamic Republic of Mauritania 2006, 7). It thus
presented its management of economic policy as a structured process, consisting of “measures” and
formal procedures, even if their transgression was rife. More generally, all successive regimes in
Mauritania since 2003 have been characterised by predatory practices, while implementing “gov-
ernance reforms” and conducing programs for the “moralisation of public life”. Repertoires of trans-
gression and circumvention have thus continuously cohabited with those of legalism and
technocratic modernisation. I therefore argue that Mauritanian political transformations can be
studied through the lens of its changing economic management procedures. In this direction, I
propose to shed a new light on Mauritanian political trajectories over the period 2003–2011.
This article builds on the approach that sociologists and historians of quantiﬁcation like Theo-
dore Porter or Alain Desrosières have developed in non-African countries (Porter 1995; Desro-
sières 1998, 2003). Their works have shown that studying the state’s statistical practices from
a sociological perspective enables us to question the different “ways of acting on the
economy” through numbers, as well as the political legitimacy associated with the production
and use of these quantitative techniques. Adopting such a perspective requires observing the con-
crete practices of economic policy management.
This has not been widely done to analyse African countries and the so-called “developing
world”. In order to do so, I also draw on some anthropological works, like Jane Guyer’s studies
of calculation practices and numbers in African economies (Guyer 2004), and on a political soci-
ology of the state in Africa derived from the works of Jean-François Bayart (Bayart 2009) and Bea-
trice Hibou (Hibou 2011a). This way I can shed a sociological and political light on the links
between economic calculation practices, economic stories and national trajectories that some
other researchers have approached in a more historical perspective, like Morten Jerven on national
income (Jerven 2013) or Vincent Bonnecase on poverty (Bonnecase 2011). Therefore, while build-
ing on the Mauritanian case, I believe the present article should also help understanding other
national situations, in Africa and more generally in countries managing their economies in close
relations with international ﬁnancial institutions, especially the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
Informalisation of the state and economic management procedures at the end of Taya’s
regime (2003–2005)
Institutions, informality and the exercise of power
At the beginning of the 2000s, Mauritania had spent a great many years as the “model pupil” of
international organisations and adjustment. In 2003–2004, international institutions still regarded
the country as having accomplished “an impressive array of structural and macroeconomic
reforms” (IMF 2003, 6). Mauritania was allowed to participate in all the pilot schemes, for
example drawing up one of the ﬁrst Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) in Africa, and
being a very early beneﬁciary of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative.
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However, bureaucratic activities and state management in Mauritania have long operated in a
context of massive informality and fraud. Macroeconomic policies offer a striking example of
this: the scale of the circumvention reﬂected in the falsiﬁcation of public accounts in the
period 2000–2005 undermines the very principle of a state budget and, still more, of any possi-
bility of steering the economy. Extra-budgetary expenditure reached 40 per cent of the budget in
2003, representing almost 12 per cent of ofﬁcial GDP at that time (Islamic Republic of Mauritania
2006). In 2004, three distinct budgetary exercises were carried out simultaneously, with none of
the three annual accounts ever being closed, making it impossible to audit or monitor expenditure
in any reliable way (IMF 2005, 16). An analysis of this type of situation forces us to leave nor-
mative concepts aside, notably in dealing with institutional logics.
Indeed the ofﬁcial administrative functions are often illusory. Until 2005, the Ministry of
Economic Affairs and Development (MAED) owed much of its prestige not to its role as “coor-
dinator of social and economic policies”, but to the management of many development projects
for which it was given direct responsibility in a largely discretionary manner. One of these pro-
jects involved the richly funded unit in charge of education reform, which was placed under the
authority of the MAED, thereby escaping that of the Ministry of Education. The Ministry of Fish-
eries, which collected ﬁnes and payments while running the trade in ﬁshing licences, was also a
site of major powers since, contrary to regulations, it did not pass on these “public receipts” to the
Treasury. Conversely, the upper ranks of the police depended largely on funding from “outside”
the state, and more precisely on the national transport federation, which was in the hands of busi-
nessmen from the president’s tribe, who had a monopoly in the sector at the time.2 More generally,
as in many countries coming out of adjustment, the proliferation of agencies, commissions, semi-
public businesses and major projects made the public sector appear highly fragmented into a great
many coveted centres of power and, to some extent, comprising a set of obscurely structured
“ﬁefs”. The bureaucratic work of the public administration was thus underpinned by a situation
in which institutional functions were often dominated by power relations and access to resources.
Several elements can help to explain how Mauritania could be a “good pupil” while showing
signs of massive informality in its public management. Mauritania only played the card of demo-
cratisation and of the docile acceptance of structural adjustment after a particularly traumatic period
in the 1980s, marked by the ethnic violence of 1989 that was a legacy of the difﬁcult birth of a
young “frontier state”, prey to many centrifugal forces (Ould Ahmed Salem 2004), and in which
the state played a central role. Since the 1980s, the Mauritanian regime has taken refuge in stabil-
isation through a tribal management of public resources (Marchesin 1992), containing the deep
socio-political rifts using authoritarian and clientelist practices (N’diaye 2006). By maintaining it
status of the “good pupil”, it thus often set itself apart in order to ensure a ﬂow of income from
outside, which was necessary both for security (Jourde 2007) and to supply government clients.
At the beginning of the 2000 decade, Mauritania was managing its many political and social ten-
sions by harvesting the fruits of its “model pupil” status and keeping up the appearances of reform.
Of course, there is nothing new about a situation in which aid goes hand in hand with author-
itarian, and clientelist domination, giving rise to a “reformist façade”.3 But the way the different
repertoires combined in Mauritania is far from anecdotal interest. On the one hand, Mauritania is a
open society, Nouakchott being a city of salons where information always gets out in rumours and
where many people and groups are aware of what the authorities and business get up to. But at the
beginning of the 2000s, the regime’s chosen weapons were silence and weasel words. Censorship
of the press was frequent, by virtue of a law of 19914 that was not abolished until the democratic
transition of 2006, and the apparatus of repression was omnipresent, with social and political life
regulated by “information bulletins”. When, it was discovered in 2004 that public sector data had
been widely instrumentalised – which was a sign of the major disorder that prevailed in the econ-
omic and ﬁnancial administrations – silence reigned. Economic management practices preserved
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an appearance of normality, but they were in fact also submitted to discipline and surveillance. For
example, the simple mention of a parallel exchange market in a newspaper would be censored,
although this market was massive and functioned openly, and the IMF had no more permission
to mention it than the newspapers.5 Similarly, since the retail price index was falsiﬁed, discussion
of the causes of inﬂation was taboo. The most ordinary economic practices provided occasions for
both massive circumvention and authoritarian practices.
Hence, while infringements were widespread until the end of the Taya era, the rules were more
or less formally preserved, and they even acted as tools of power and oppression.
In these years, Mauritania was also subject to a great deal of informality linked to a rush to
appropriate the multiple national rents. In the forefront was the prospect of the arrival of the
oil industry, ofﬁcially announced by Taya on 28 November 2002, which led to a doubling of
the state budget by 2010. Although hopes of an oil boom soon disappeared, their effects on
the economy were massive, notably through highly optimistic forecasts that made the national
market “attractive”. They generated a great deal of national and international investments (in con-
struction, infrastructure and services, for example) and an accompanying housing boom. In
addition, ﬁshing, iron ore industry and the development aid contributed to make public money
abundant and providential (Ould Ahmed Salem 2008). The state, to use the expression of
Abdel Wedoud Ould Cheikh, could be compared to a “boutique structure” (Ould Cheikh
2006). This obviously had multiple consequences for economic management, as attested by
the mechanisms for falsifying data that I shall describe below.
Informalisation and economic management procedures: the falsiﬁcation of economic and
ﬁnancial statistics
Informal management of resources at the heart of the economic ﬁction
By 2003, the falsiﬁcation of the macroeconomic accounts had reached an impressive scale: as shown
by the re-evaluation undertaken in 2005 and 2006, the money supply was twice as big as that shown
in the ofﬁcial statistics. The currency reserves, ofﬁcially representing 12 months of imports, in fact
covered two weeks. The ﬁgures had been falsiﬁed since 1992 at least, and on a grand scale since
1995 (Islamic Republic of Mauritania 2006). They masked illegal uses of public money, the pro-
vision of funds to private individuals and fraudulent access to the currency reserves. Several types
of mechanism were used: so-called extra-budgetary expenditure, in other words public expenditure
carried out by the Treasury but without legal authorisation; the anarchic opening of credit facilities
with the Central Bank; debits to the Treasury’s accounts at the Central Bank without the knowledge
of the Ministry of Finance; privileged access to the exchange market for some individuals; and so on.
From 1995, many of these sums initially corresponded to military expenditure ordered by the presi-
dent of the republic.6 In addition, some major public programmes operated off-budget, such as the
emergency food programmes of 2003 and 2004. Lastly, as discovered later, particularly lucrative
operations were carried out behind the back of the Central Bank for the proﬁt of individuals. For
example, credit facilities were made available to primary banks without justiﬁcation in 2001 and
2002, as was widely publicised when some of the country’s most important businessmen belonging
to the tribe of the former president were sent to prison in 2009 (Cherif 2009).
The role of the IMF in national economic calculation procedures
The management of ﬁnancial and economic policies also involved formal procedures. The IMF
teams notably played a crucial part in the process of constructing the economic picture. Their
interventions provided the underlying procedures on the basis of which policies were developed
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and to which administrative activity was linked. As a recipient of IMF loans until 2005, Mauri-
tania was also subject to the constant “monitoring” of its policies and statistical indicators by IMF
teams, who went to Nouakchott at least three or four times a year. They worked closely with the
Mauritanian authorities, providing very concrete support to the development of economic pol-
icies: they discussed the consistency of the ﬁgures; the techniques used to produce them; how
they should be interpreted; the technical hypotheses on which they were based; and so on. Ulti-
mately, the IMF teams actually validated the economic policies and statistical data on which
access to funds was based.7 So we can say that the statistical ﬁction that remained in place for
over 15 years really was built up before their eyes. The question is not even whether or not
these ofﬁcials knew whether the ﬁgures were ﬂawed. The fact is that they were continuously
monitoring the methodologies and building the base on which the ﬁction was elaborated by
the government.
We can go even further. Government departments talked to each other very little in the years
2003–2005. The withholding of information was at its height at the end of the Taya era. During
this period interministerial cooperation, and even that between divisions and departments within a
single institution, was completely blocked by the impossibility of gaining access to the other
side’s information, which was totally inconsistent and, therefore, kept highly secret. For
example, just as it was extremely difﬁcult for the national accounts unit of the National Ofﬁce
for Statistics (ONS) to obtain information from the customs directorate of the Ministry of
Finance, so it was sometimes very difﬁcult, within the ONS itself, to gather detailed ﬁgures in
relation to prices, although these were produced by another unit in the same building. Meanwhile,
a bureaucratic coping system was established to get round the barriers: so, when ofﬁcials from the
MAED were granted the privilege of obtaining data that ONS departments could not get hold of –
such as information on ﬁshing and customs – they would pass them on to their colleagues and vice
versa. Many administrative relationships were contingent on the small details of everyday ofﬁce
life, interpersonal relationships, friendships and even tribal relationships. The same was true, in a
more exacerbated form, when it came to deﬁning “economic policy”: for example, the budgetary
forecasts prepared by the Ministry of Finances were transmitted to other ministries only with dif-
ﬁculty, including to those colleagues who were theoretically closest, such as those at the Ministry
of Economy. In such an opaque context, formulating any economic policy was a very delicate
matter; administrative compartmentalisation, opacity and informality reigned against a back-
ground of false accounting.
But, at the same time, the IMF and its procedures played a key role in coordinating the Maur-
itanian technical work. As an IMF member Mauritania was under statutory obligation to pass on
data to the IMF teams, who thus created centralised sets of ﬁgures that no national institution
could have put together. The procedures by which macroeconomic policies were formulated
thus radiated out from around the IMF teams. They alone were able to produce an overall
view of the economy and put together all the pieces of the puzzle. In practice this meant that pro-
cedures for formulating economic and ﬁnancial policy existed, but were not centralised within the
government. The formalisation process was broadly coordinated, more or less unknowingly, by
the IMF itself. This is a crucial observation: rather than being a carefully planned and fully con-
trolled construction, the lie was based on an “anarchy” of bureaucratic procedures (Blum and
Mespoulet 2003) deployed around a set of international procedures and rules.
Putting an indistinguishable reality into numbers
This confusion was reinforced by the fact that the misuse of resources was a haphazard affair. To
borrow the words of a former high-ranking ofﬁcial, for a long time it was so easy to open illegal
credit facilities at the Central Bank, that all those who were in a position to do so “helped
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themselves from the till”. When the new governor, Zeine Ould Zeidane, arrived in July 2004, 95
per cent of open accounts were not legitimate.8 Where the budget was concerned, the mechanisms
seem equally haphazard: major emergency programmes conducted on an entirely extra-budgetary
basis and run from high up in the administration (for example at the time of the droughts of 2003,
or the anti-locust campaigns of 2004) coexisted with the processing of everyday expenses, which
managers would unofﬁcially send to the budget ofﬁce because it was simpler and more ﬂexible to
do so. Accelerated and extra-budgetary procedures would be used to acquire a ream of paper or
for the reception of an important guest. It was easier to incur expenses using exceptional budget
procedures (“automatic debit letter” or “request for immediate payment”) and thereby circumvent
the entire monitoring system.
Thus, lies happened while – and partly because – a multiform and largely unrecorded reality
was to be quantiﬁed in ﬁgures. The national and international economic experts, by putting a
largely indistinguishable reality into numbers, were at the same time guardians of the norms
and producing the ﬁction. Sometimes, however, the gap would become too large and the existence
of a real lie would become obvious. For example, in 2003 and 2004, the authorities claimed to
have enough foreign currency reserves to convert the entire ofﬁcial money supply, while at the
same time the parallel exchange rate was constantly rising, a sign that the monetary authorities
did not have enough hard currency to stabilise the Mauritanian currency (ouguiya).
This enables us to understand better how the Mauritanian government was able to say, in
2006, that it had formulated its economic policies on the basis of erroneous data. The formal econ-
omic procedures were intrinsically meshed with the means to circumvent them. We also under-
stand that IMF procedures had structured the production of economic aggregates, because they
obliged the government to put the economy into numbers. The ﬁgures were ﬂawed because
they could not account for the informal mecanisms driving the economy, but they reﬂected the
use of international methods.9
The collapse of the ﬁction
The ﬁction fell apart between 2004 and 2005, in the context of a broad movement to deligitimise
Taya’s power. In the national administration, international organisations or economic spheres,
everybody knew that the statistics were very fragile, so it was not a real surprise. It was, for
example, widely known that price statistics or external trade statistics were not accurate
because of the use of ﬂawed methods (Samuel 2011). However, the scale of the lies was much
greater than anybody could guess. The starting point for the “discovery” of the ﬁction was a
change of regulation at the IMF (safeguards assessment policy), which, in 2003, led the fund’s
departments to ask for an entirely routine audit of the Central Bank’s foreign exchange reserves.
But the Mauritanian authorities refused, for fear of being unmasked, particularly as the foreign
exchange reserves were one of the most heavily falsiﬁed indicators. The authorities thus tried
to gain time and kept the IMF at bay in 2003, and again in 2004. But in the struggle a corner
of the veil of deceitful statistics was gradually lifted, revealing illegal practices that proved
central to the spiral ending in Taya’s downfall.
By this time, the plundering of public resources, which had taken place on an unprecedented
scale from 2000, started to have untenable consequences. First, the decidedly “expansionist” bud-
getary and monetary policies and the trade in currencies caused a wave of inﬂation and devalua-
tion of the ouguiya; this caused the prices of food and imported products to shoot up, fostering a
sense of frustration and exacerbating discontent among Mauritanian people. Numerous tensions
emerged among the elite in the battles over the appropriation of resources; for example, around
the fallout from oil exploitation (Augé 2007; Bensaâd 2007). And when Taya, who appointed
Zeine Ould Zeidane as governor of the Central Bank in the summer of 2004, played the card
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of confessing its lies at the IMF, the regime made enemies of some of the businessmen closest to
the centres of power, who had done very well out the system. Therefore, Taya was ultimately left
behind in the race for appropriation of resources. The regime was rendered still more unstable by
the security situation – an attack by the GSPC (Salaﬁst group for preaching and combat) shook the
north of the country in the summer of 2004 – and by the consequences of the presidential election
ﬁasco of 2003, which saw Taya re-elected at the price of all kinds of repression used against the
opposition and his political opponents (Bensaâd 2006). These events in turn encouraged the fal-
siﬁcation of the ﬁgures, since massive military spending was carried out off-budget in 2003 and
2004, to which expenditure on the electoral campaign was added. All in all, the economic ﬁction
was fuelled by a series of elements that combined to delegitimise the regime, while the discovery
of the deception made the government’s position worse, creating a vicious circle.
So, beyond its purely technical signiﬁcance, the revelation of the falsiﬁcation of the ﬁgures
and the end of the economic ﬁction should be understood as the collapse of a mode of domination.
While the revelation of the ﬁction was triggered and caused by the reserves audit, it represented a
far more complex and multiform event.
Technocrats and the exercise of power: accumulation and modernisation of the state
In an apparent paradox, however, a relative technocratic autonomy cohabited during Taya’s era
with procedural anarchy. In a manner similar to the role played by the IMF ofﬁcials in the stat-
istical ﬁction, technocratic language was omnipresent inside the administration. The work of
the technocrats involved wielding economic language in an environment marked by pervasive
transgression, but the presence of a technocratic ethos was actually not incompatible with decep-
tion, not even with power struggles.10
Technical knowledge and the modernisation market
Administrative engineering was central to an important “market in modernisation”. Technocratic
operations received a great deal of ﬁnance, both from the state and in the form of aid provided by
international donors as part of “capacity building” and “institutional development”, which had
been development watchwords since the late 1990s.
Very large sums were indeed devoted to modernising the state. The resulting modernisation
market undoubtedly engendered a “rent-based economy”, leading to spending on a plethora of
dubious projects, consultations that were not properly targeted, and the organisation of workshops
with their attendant buffets and directors’ fees. But to describe the political economy of reform
and modernisation, we need to go further. For example, when a World Bank Trust Fund ﬁnances
the production of a “poverty proﬁle” or a “poverty map”, as it did in 2004, and this to the tune of
several hundred million dollars, should we see it as no more than a wafer-thin technocratic
facade? Not necessarily. To do so would be to neglect that, even in the Mauritanian sociopolitical
context, managers and leaders of the economic and ﬁnancial administration do share a techno-
cratic interpretation of reality and, to a certain extent, a belief in the power of technique to under-
pin ways of governing. To this extent it is possible that “aid rents”, despite being reappropriated in
many different ways, may lead to the adoption of “modernising” practices, informed by knowl-
edge and skills. We can even seek to identify elements of a “demand for modernisation” in this
market (Hibou 2011b).
The example of macroeconomic forecasting provides an interesting example of this demand.
The macroeconomic modelling that has proliferated in Mauritania in the last 10 years is an invar-
iant of capacity building projects, even though the ﬁgures were long falsiﬁed, and are anyway
largely produced at the interface with the IMF. A range of international experts have nevertheless
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been called on from time to time by the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the ONS and Ministry of
Finance to launch a new study in search of the right model. Organisations approached by the min-
istries have included the World Bank, the French Statistical Institute, Afristat or the African
Development Bank. How should this be understood? In practice, methods of macroeconomic
forecasting are of major practical and symbolic importance to directors and top ofﬁcials in the
Ministries of the Economy and Finance (Samuel 2011).
One aim in improving them is to gain greater power in negotiations with the IMF and the
World Bank. Moreover, forecasting structures a raft of relationships within the administration.
It provides the basis for collaboration (through the transmission of statistical data) and simul-
taneously for emulation between departments, even in the unstable, compartmentalised conditions
we have described. The different Directorates of Finances, Planning and the Central Bank thus
compete to have their forecasts prevail, for example in relation to taxation during the preparation
of annual exercises such as the budget, and exchange these forecasts either directly or through the
IMF. In addition, models also play a part in international activities, since experiences are
exchanged between the teams of forecasters and economists of different countries in sub-
Saharan and North Africa, and indeed between oil producing countries,11 which meet at many
international and regional seminars. So we can see why in Mauritania there is consequently
not only a demand, but also, in a sense, a “race for models”.
When use of the Model of the Mauritanian Economy (MEMAU),12 Mauritania’s historical
model hosted by the MAED, gradually fell away, its replacement gave rise to a great many pro-
jects. While the fortunes of these research projects differed, some produced concrete results (such
as the so-called Tablo model, a recent updating of MEMAU, and the World Bank’s Poverty
Analysis Macroeconomic Simulator [PAMS] model). Beyond the objective to help making the
best possible decisions, the sophisticated “ritual” of quantiﬁcation was driving Mauritanian econ-
omists (Power 1999).
All this suggests that a technocratic ethos based on expertise and a certain understanding of
ways of “managing the economy” (Desrosières 2003) could exist within administrative depart-
ments, and drive their work, even in a context of informality. The expertise market was not
even linked solely to the availability of external funding and “extraversion rents”. In the model-
ling ﬁeld, projects emerged that were ﬁnanced entirely from within Mauritania. For example, the
Explorer Center, set up in 2003–2004, used its own funds to bring in French researchers and ran
sessions ﬁnanced by the Mauritanian state. Moreover, bonuses were long paid to managers and
public agents in the economic and ﬁnancial departments who were working to establish macro-
economic forecasts. This contextualisation of modelling can of course be applied, to different
degrees, to many other techniques. Typically, some instruments in fashion in the development
world, such as “medium-term expenditure frameworks”, exerted an attraction over administrative
departments (Samuel 2009). This attraction exerted by technical productions, rarely considered in
discussions of the work of administrative departments in Africa, was very real, however
paradoxical.
The emergence of an elite of experts
It is also notable that technocratic and technical competences led to the formation of dominant
groups, even if their skills were later lost in an administration operating primarily through the inter-
play of inﬂuence and accommodation. So, for 10 years a small group of high-ranking ofﬁcials with
the proﬁle of international experts controlled Mauritania’s ﬁnances, steered the economy and
guided the “reforms” from within a small club of relatively stable economic and ﬁnancial insti-
tutions (MAED, ONS, Mauritanian Centre for Policy Analysis [CMAP], Ministry of Finance,
Central Bank of Mauritania [BCM]). The managers of these institutions worked very closely
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together and were generally products of the major French universities and schools (such as the
École national d’administration [ÉNA]); they had often taken the same courses and had since devel-
oped a sense of solidarity, or even a kind of corporatism. The functioning of theMauritanian admin-
istrative system facilitated the rapid rise of technocrats, some very brilliant, who were of course
appreciated by donors and lenders and ran the country from the administrative departments of
the economics and ﬁnance ministries. Some also moved on to the political stage.
This was true of Zeine Ould Zeidane who, in a few years, moved from running a macroeco-
nomic model in a small planning department ofﬁce to the post of prime minister. In the course of
this rise, he built up a reputation for technical skill13 (and people skills, since he is married to the
daughter of General Boukhreiss, one of Taya’s closer allies). But in this he followed a long line of
politicians who made their careers on, among other things, their image as technocrats, such as
former Prime Minister Sidi Mohamed Ould Boubacar, who owed his reputation to his image
as a considered and enlightened expert, and Mohamedou Ould Michel, who has just retired but
was still an advisor to the 2007 elected President Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi after a long
career under Taya.
Of course, I am not seeking to turn these ﬁgures into virtuous “heroes”, but to emphasise that,
contrary to what is generally believed (Banégas and Warnier 2001), “models of success” also
value the role of technocratic competence in driving successful careers and relationships of dom-
ination. By the way, legitimation by competence combines with other repertoires of power. Direc-
tor and later Minister of Planning Abdallahi Ould Cheikh Sidya was the illustrious descendant of a
marabout family and an ÉNA graduate who long remained typical of the elite and was respected
as much for his prestigious birth as for his competent image. That he was, as head of Planning
before 2004, one of the architects of the great falsiﬁcation operation did not affect his prestige.
There is nothing unusual about this combination between trickery, technical and aristocratic reper-
toires in Mauritania (Ould Ahmed Salem 2001).
So the proﬁles of technocrats can provide a source of legitimacy, even when circumvention of
the rules is the rule itself. In the moral economy of trickery (tcheb-tchib) described by Zekeria
Ould Ahmed Salem (2001), technical dexterity and understanding are certainly not discredited;
indeed, they are very useful to the el-gazra, the squatter skilled in the use of deceit to appropriate
public resources. This conﬁrms what Jean-François Bayart has shown about the Cameroonian
feymen, who use their skills in trickery at the interface between the state, global procedures
and deeply rooted social values (Bayart 2004; Bayart, Ellis, and Hibou 1999; Malaquais
2001); it also conﬁrms Beatrice Hibou’s ﬁndings that the social value of trickery is often to be
seen at the heart of formal economic management procedures (Bayart, Ellis, and Hibou 1999).
What the Mauritanian case tells us here goes one step further, however: even in a situation
where the fraud is massive, technocratic skills can be valued for themselves and be combined
with deceit in the everyday management of the state.
Of course, appointments are often based on inﬂuence, nepotism and tribal and ethnic criteria
(Marchesin 1992). Very often, managers ﬁnd their careers blocked because of their ethnic or
tribal origins, which may inﬂuence the course of their entire careers (Ould Cheikh 1998). But com-
petence and technical skills are nonetheless evident criteria in the rise of many Mauritanian ﬁgures
and underpin one vision of the state and government. From this point of view there is no inevitable
contradiction between the valuing of competence, themodernising ethos and transgressivemanage-
ment practices in the administration, in which these same ofﬁcials are also involved, as I shall show.
Overlaps between positions of “reform” and accumulation
An instrumental reading would assume that governance reforms seek to prevent the diversion of
funds and quest for gain. But an analysis “from below” (Bayart, Mbembe, and Toulabor 2008) of
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administrative practices shows on the contrary that the repertoires of modernisation can combine
with those of peculation in the everyday management of public administration. The ﬁrst example
is the private consultancy work undertaken by many ofﬁcials.14 All technically effective ofﬁcials
can expect to gain consultancy contracts in the specialist ﬁelds they work in as public servants,
and of course render their administrative posts proﬁtable through the revenue generated by
their private work.
This means that they are also “development brokers” proﬁting from the governance market
(Bierschenk, Chauveau, and Olivier de Sardan 2000; Lewis and Mosse 2006; Blundo and Le
Meur 2009). I shall return to this later, as another, less obvious overlap must be noted. The
accumulation of different administrative functions sometimes enables individuals to combine a
number of assignments that give them direct responsibility to manage resources with work on
administrative engineering and reform intended to improve governance. Because activities in
both ﬁelds are performed by the same people, they can be subject to a kind of vertical integration,
thereby creating wide margins for manoeuvre. A paradigmatic illustration of this is offered by the
directorate of education and training projects, which, until 2007, was in charge of reforming the
education sector.15 This directorate monitored all the governance reforms in the education sector,
carried out periodic evaluations of aid programmes, but it was also responsible for the effective
use of a large share of the funds provided by the International Education for All Initiative. It long
had control over extrabudgetary funds, an arrangement often criticised for its opacity (the aid pro-
vided for this programme was “budgetised” in the donors’ eyes, but it made only a rapid detour
through the Treasury coffers).
The man who was long the director of education and training, Weddoud Kamil, is known for
his technical abilities – he is an international expert on education planning – but was much cri-
ticised for the opacity of his management. We should mention that he is also the brother-in-
law of Maaouya Ould Taya. In practice, such situations are common. People at the MAED
prepare the state’s investment budget, supervise the transfer of funds to project heads and
prepare the statistics that are used to evaluate macroeconomic performance and respect of expen-
diture ceilings. The same people are thus in a position both to promote the new tools of rigour –
for which they beneﬁt from training and capacity building programmes – to manage the funds,
and to falsify the ﬁgures, so they develop a highly polysemous relationship to the “sums”.
Such mechanisms explain how, in Mauritania as in almost all the countries of Africa, state invest-
ment ﬁgures are systematically underestimated in order to get round the ceilings set by the IMF.
“Marginal gains” and technical skills
We could even go so far as to state that certain economic policy operations can in fact be assimi-
lated into “transactions”, combining predatory activities with the mobilisation of skills and
knowledge. We have heard witnesses speak of extreme cases in which statistical tables relating
to the public ﬁnances were bought from high-ranking civil servants by international ofﬁcials.
The justiﬁcation given was that these tables were not immediately accessible and required a
degree of expertise. In addition, they were vital to the writing of an evaluation report that had
to be drawn up by the international ﬁnancial institutions. Furthermore, the ﬁgures were produced
at the very period of the statistical lies. Such cases are very interesting, because they combine
many elements in a single “transaction”: technical competence; individual interest; “privatisation”
of the administration (Hibou 2004); production of the economic ﬁction; working methods of inter-
national organisations. Such mechanisms – which very precisely materialise the “marginal gains”
described by Jane Guyer in elucidating the functioning of what she calls “formalities” (Guyer
2004) – help us understand how a concrete combination of different and apparently contradictory
repertoires can operate within procedures for the “management” of the public ﬁnances.
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Therefore, an ethos of modernisation can blossom in the shadow of networks of inﬂuence, all
in the name of promoting a state underpinned by law and rationality. The polysemous, ambivalent
nature of reforms and technocratic activities also explain how forms of domination can emerge
out of modernising activities. It also contributes, more or less paradoxically, to lay the foundations
for a certain kind of “technocratic legitimacy” (Hibou 2011b).
I now turn to the dynamics of formalisation and informalisation of the state to analyse the tra-
jectories of the power after the end of the Taya regime, in August 2005.
The “transition to democracy” (2005–2008): power struggles and reformist feats
In August 2005, President Taya was overthrown by his own colonels, whose leader, Ely Ould
Mohamed Vall, took over as head of a military council for justice and democracy (CMJD) and
raised many hopes with a policy of transition to democracy. During the transition period,
among a broad series of reforms, the economic ﬁgures were corrected and a new economic
history was built with the help of the international organisations, as witnessed by the Report
on The Revision of Macroeconomic Figures 1992–2004 (Islamic Republic of Mauritania
2006). Such reforms undoubtedly conferred a high degree of legitimacy on the transition, but
they remained ambivalent, the priority of the government being to restore the international
trust and the ﬂow of international aid as quickly as possible. Mauritania reconnected indeed
with the IMF in the ﬁrst half of 2006, beneﬁting from debt rescheduling only a few months
later, but away from this visible activity the greater part of the administration was kept in a
state of relative apathy. The “democratic” period opened with the presidential elections of
April 2007 that brought President Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi to power. The Consultative
group meeting held in Paris in December 2007, originated in the period of the CMJD, is an inter-
esting moment to relocate technocratic issues within the economic and political trajectory of
Mauritania.
The return of the “model country”
During 2006, the work that had been halted after the fall of Taya was gradually restarted in the
summer of 2005. The PRSP, left dormant by the transition government was restarted on the insis-
tence of donors, who needed a programme on which to base their support for the transition and
democratisation. Meanwhile, discussions with the IMF and the World Bank also raised again the
need for a “medium-term expenditure framework” (MTEF) in order to identify the broad choices
for state expenditure. The demand for planning was thus very high. A working group on the
MTEF met in 2006, comprising the Ministries of the Economy and Finance and various periph-
eral actors. But the exercise proved complex and laborious. The transition and its major political
manoeuvres were underway; elections were in prospect and large-scale administrative studies
were out of favour with the economic and ﬁnancial directorates. In addition, the macroeconomic
data revision was still fresh, whereas the preparation of an MTEF demanded an unprecedented
abundance of details. Mauritania was also bringing in its ﬁrst oil receipts and plans for the use
of budgetary resources were far from settled. Moreover, collaboration between the administrative
directorates of the Ministries of the Economy and Finance proved difﬁcult, and the working group
did not really seem to be a priority for those involved. All these elements made the exercise
difﬁcult.
However, the resident representative of the World Bank, who had recently arrived in the
country, was working hard to turn Mauritania into an example of “best practice”; he probably
also wanted to use his time there as a launching pad for his own rise through his organisation.
To this end he planned to promote the development of a collaborative Country Assistance
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Strategy (CAS) for the World Bank, which would then make it possible to set up a “model” Con-
sultative group. Once the Mauritanian transition was well underway, the representative’s plan had
certain attractions; in particular, it was giving weight to the reprise of partnerships between the
government and donors, who were actively sponsoring democratisation.
For this it was crucial to have an MTEF as the underlying programme. But work on the MTEF
in the Ministry of Finance and the MAED was behind schedule. The resident representative
became impatient. Eventually, wearied by the lack of success encountered by his initiative, he
looked around for alternative solutions and seized the opportunity offered by other ongoing
works to get round the difﬁculties. In the absence of any good and proper programme of the
MTEF type, he fell back on far simpler, more general calculations of the sums necessary to
reach the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). At the time, such works were in preparation
by both the the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank. This was
not on the same scale as the MTEF, but it made it possible to start discussions. He enjoyed the
crucial support of the Minister of Economic Affairs, Mohamed Ould Abed, a high-ﬂying civil
servant, graduate of the ÉNA and éminence grise of many reforms carried out by the government
since the late 1990s.
So a major exercise was carried out in 2006–2007 involving donors, the state administration
and civil society to plan Mauritania’s development strategies. The initiative generated major
events: in March 2006 large gatherings were organised using video-conferencing in multiplexes
in several countries. The exercise was in tune with its time, giving rise to various presentations
permitting the development of a form of language unconstrained by the empty bureaucratic rheto-
ric of the Taya era. As well as policies, debates focused on the functioning of Mauritanian society
and its barriers, or the challenges of good management, in politico-technocratic arenas unused to
such discussions. So the resident representative successfully pulled off his tour de force, driven by
his personal ambitions and supported by the administration. This process, which remained tech-
nically unconvincing and very much focused on theWorld Bank, was nonetheless gradually trans-
formed into a “technocratic feat” on the part of the regime.
The technocratic feat of a delegitimised regime: the Consultative group of December
2007
After the election of Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi in April 2007, work began on the preparation of
a Consultative group celebrating democracy. Work on the MTEF started up again. For the ﬁrst
time in Mauritania, detailed budgetary planning was undertaken, based on the PRSP and the
funding intentions of the donors. The brand new Ministry of the Economy and Finance, reuni-
ﬁed, provided the right framework for this kind of work, which required collaboration between
the budget directorate and the directorate responsible for cooperation and planning. This collab-
oration went well, thanks to a great many senior executives who had been promoted while Zeine
Ould Zeidane was prime minister. This time the sophisticated MTEF could be ﬁnalised. The
preparation for the group achieved something hitherto unimaginable in the Mauritanian admin-
istration due to an impressive combination of favourable factors, including extensive involve-
ment by donors, the input of highly experienced technocrats, a relative absence of barriers to
the circulation of information and a “successful” democratisation that justiﬁed holding Maurita-
nia up as an international example. The MTEF reﬂected a voluntarist development policy scen-
ario and put the price of the “return of hope” at 1.6 billion dollars. The donors met at the World
Bank’s ofﬁces in Paris on 4, 5 and 6 December 2007, established their contributions and, in a
major bureaucratic exercise, promised donations of 2.1 billion dollars; 500 million more than
the sum requested by the government – a “democratisation bonus” as Zeine Ould Zeidane put
it (Meunier 2007).
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However, these plans were never realised, since Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi was removed
from power by Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz in the summer of 2008. The coup d’état led to the
suspension of all cooperation programmes for around a year, until the spring of 2009. But techno-
cratic feats notwithstanding, a closer look shows that the Consultative group already contained all
the seeds of the future instability.
In practice the Consultative group straddled the regime’s internal divisions. As always, the
government was a patchwork resulting from the horse-trading of appointments between the
various currents and spheres. But the tensions derived from the post-electoral negotiations
were particularly high. The government included military personnel from the CMJD, who got
Sidi elected and imposed appointments on him, Sidi himself, who was bound by the political
agreements he had made with other parties, and Zeine Ould Zeidane, who came third in the pre-
sidential election and had exchanged his support in the second round for the post of prime min-
ister. The governmental equation was thus complex from the outset. The Consultative group gave
Zeine an opportunity to impose his style through a technocratic process of which he was the prime
embodiment. Indeed, the prime minister was counting on this to save his political future. He was
in a very vulnerable position: he did not control his government and he was in dispute with the
president, who had relieved him of the management of the most important dossiers, notably the
return of refugees from Senegal, and the emergency food programme linked to the crisis of 2007–
2008. So the Consultative group was very important to him, beyond the beauty of the exercise and
its promises of development. But Abderrahmane Ould Hama Vezzaz, minister of the economy
and ﬁnance and one of the president’s men, also wanted to proﬁt from the event, and the struggles
were apparent at the time of the Paris meeting (Meunier 2008). The technocratic aspect, a key
strength of Sidi’s regime, thus appears at once as the element supposed to save the government’s
image and the focus of the internal quarrels that were destroying the same government’s ability to
govern (Ould Oumère 2007; Véridique 2008).
More seriously, this technocratic orientation crystallised the discontent of the Mauritanian
people and helped speed up the regime’s loss of legitimacy and credibility. The government
was regularly accused of hiding behind piles of expert reports and being unable to meet expec-
tations where the most important dossiers were concerned, in a context marked by intense
social problems and rising prices (Tahalil Hebdo 2007). Furthermore, the reforms and good man-
agement that had been hoped for now seemed largely illusory. For example, complaints were
mounting concerning the activities of President Abdallahi’s inner circle, notably his wife
Khattou Mint El Boukhary, who was accused of diverting public money intended for social pol-
icies via her charity. The Special Intervention Programme – a 169 million euro plan set up to alle-
viate the consequences of drought and rising food prices – was in practice carried out off-budget
and gave rise to many instances of diversion of funds. The government had also started instrumen-
talising budgetary processes. The establishment of a computer program for monitoring expendi-
ture, known as the Rachad application, symbolising the transparency of the public ﬁnances, was
blocked for several months in 2007/08 in order to circumvent it.
It would probably be an exaggeration to suggest that the technocratic orientation of the regime
was a cause of the subsequent divorce between government and citizens, but it was undeniably
positioned at the intersection of several fault lines that caused the regime to fall. In one sense,
the August 2008 coup d’état also signiﬁed the failure of a Mauritania that had played the card
of formal procedures throughout the transition process. Although technocratic rhetoric was
never a match for the social issues, the government had instigated sophisticated technical exer-
cises and tried to proﬁt from them through external rents and a modernising rhetoric that inter-
national donors often encouraged. But the main effect of this approach was to discredit the
regime and increase disappointment. For a while technocratic constructions had maintained the
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ﬁction of successful transition, but at the same time they fuelled instability, disappointment and
loss of legitimacy.
The Mauritania of Aziz: the economic procedures of a fragile country ﬁghting against
terror
After his coup in August 2008, General Abdel Aziz established a “rectiﬁcatory period”. As jus-
tiﬁcation for his coup d’état – perpetrated in the name of the “preservation of democracy” – he
notably cited the former president’s management practices and actions judged irresponsible for
national security. Mauritania was shaken by terrorist attacks and preserving the country was
one of his main justiﬁcations. He faced a strong internal and external opposition. But his
skilful conduct of dialogue with the political parties opposed to the putsch (the “Dakar
process”) gave him legitimacy in the eyes of external partners (Antil 2010). On the national
scene, a populist language and social rhetoric gave him some popularity after the coup, and facili-
tated his success at the ballot box organised in 2009.
Seen through the lens of economic and ﬁnancial procedures, new modes of government seem
to have emerged with Ould Abdel Aziz’s regime.
Economic policies under the regime of Abdel Aziz: new “ways of acting on the economy”?
Today the MAED is often cited as an example of a weakened administration. While the Ministry
of the Economy and Finance was once again separated into two parallel ofﬁces in the putsch of the
summer of 2008 – as seen above, the ministry had been uniﬁed in 2007 in what appeared then as a
good practice – the readoption of this structure did not bring about a return to the historic division
of tasks. In the separation the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Development lost its historic role
in preparing and managing the investment budget, which included all donor projects. In addition,
since 2008 the posts of directors have been ﬁlled by a series of risky appointments. It became
common that unconcerned and even incompetent individuals hold top positions within the min-
istry, which is unusual for a department that has long acted as a launch pad for high-ﬂying admin-
istrative and political careers (Boluumbal 2011). As a result, its output is often judged to be at a
standstill, by both aid agencies and former or current ofﬁcials. This has led to the MAED appear-
ing as something of an “empty shell” compared to its former power, which is a matter of regret for
many observers. However, such a view seems a little hasty. Leaving aside any nostalgia, its func-
tioning also seems to reﬂect a new way of “governing the economy”.
First, as we have seen, for a long time one source of the MAED’s power was the many very
important development projects (in education, urban development, capacity building, and so on)
that came under its direct responsibility. For years this situation had been criticised by inter-
national organisations as an infringement of governance, which pushed the government to
hand these project cells over to sectoral ministries in 2007. However, these projects and pro-
grammes have recently been returned to the MAED. Some commentators have justiﬁed this
measure by the insufﬁciencies of the sectoral ministries; but aside from such arguments, it
remains the case that the MAED is once more playing a pivotal role, intervening in many different
sectors, and indeed concentrating power in the hands of economic administrators. Furthermore,
this move, which is somewhat reminiscent of the Taya period, seems to reﬂect a more general
redeployment of state intervention in the economy, with a great many ramiﬁcations now devel-
oping. One major development under Aziz has been the proliferation of agencies, public enter-
prises and organisations. A national agency for monitoring major projects (ANSP), directly
linked to the president’s ofﬁce, was created in 2010, with the task of monitoring and, theoretically,
evaluating “presidential” projects, which are largely carried out off-budget. In 2011, a new
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ﬁnancial arm of the state, closely linked with the MAED (the “Caisse des dépôts et de développe-
ment”) was created in order to ﬁnance large-scale projects and intervene in public enterprises.
Many public enterprises (a dozen in the ﬁeld of transport alone) have also been set up to
pursue many different objectives, but their dubious justiﬁcations and opacity are criticised by
both the opposition and the World Bank and the IMF (World Bank 2011, 23; Union des
Forces de Progrès 2011). So we should read the evolution of the MAED in parallel to this pro-
liferation of channels of economic intervention, which contributes to the expansion of the
rhizome state (Bayart 2009) and recalls the atomisation of the public sector under Taya, which
paved the way for informalisation.
Another factor suggests that the MAED has regained importance: judging by the organisation
of a new round table of donors in 2010, the current strategy of the MAED for raising international
ﬁnance appears very well thought, making it a masterpiece for the current regime. Unlike the 2007
Consultative group, the 2010 round table was called for by the national authorities, and the min-
ister, Sidi Ould Tah, proved very skilful at organising the event in Brussels in July 2010. Different
approaches were used with each of the different donor “types”, with different issues at stake in
each case. Western donors and international organisations afﬁliated to the OECD’s Development
Assistance Committee (DAC), heirs to the classic conception of development aid, were at the
centre of the event. Then there were the Arab donors who, though they do not shun the delibera-
tions of the OECD-aligned donors, have very different networks and modes of management.
Interested above all in getting their money back, dialogue around policies did not interest them
in the same way. So, they were given a separate round table, held a few weeks later. This was
the second time this judicious format was adopted, the ﬁrst being in 2007. Lastly, negotiations
with the Chinese were different again, tending to operate in semi-commercial modes (around
the eventual purchase of raw materials, for example) and remained separated. The possibility
of a third round table for the Chinese has been frequently raised, more or less ironically, reﬂecting
the many efforts made by the current minister to ﬁnd Chinese ﬁnance, which have been a subject
of sarcasm and debate.16 The fact is that Chinese ﬁnance is important for the regime, both for the
commission it generates, as denounced by many observers, and because it has become strategi-
cally crucial in a context where European aid is drying up and there are uncertainties in relation
to the Arabs (Quotidien de Nouakchott 2011a). Overall, the MAED appears highly effective in
deploying the science of raising external ﬁnance.
But in a major contrast with the Consultative group, it was impossible, however, for the ser-
vices of the MAED and Ministry of Finance to bring an MTEF or budgetary programme to the
round table. One of the main reasons was the sudden transfer of functions between the Ministry of
Finance and the Ministry of Economic Affairs. The departments no longer work readily together
and, according to some managers, Ministry of Finance departments no longer want to collaborate
with MAED planning units for the allocation of investment funds; meanwhile, the MAED no
longer has the technical skills to undertake alone such a planning exercise. So, in contrast to
the sophistication of the Consultative group of 2007, at the round table a simple list of “priority
projects” requiring ﬁnance was put forward. True, this did form a basis for discussions with
donors and in the MAED departments; no effort was spared to make it as “consistent” as possible
with “needs”. What is interesting in this situation, apart from the administrative compartmentali-
sation that seems to have returned with a vengeance, is that such a list easily opens the door to
various interventions and manipulations: indeed, after the MAED departments had done their
work, the list was substantially amended to include promises and undertakings the president
had previously given; many projects he had promised while touring the country were included
in the national “priority investment programme”. The new technocratic organisation of the
MAED thus opens up new margins for discretionary actions, redeploying the power games sur-
rounding technical procedures.
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From “good pupil rent” to “security rent”: the regime’s international carte blanche
Aid issues are also posed today in radically different terms from those of the previous regime, due
to the terrorist threat which served to justify the 2008 coup d’état. And it seems that this contrib-
utes to renewing the style of economic management as well. For the preparation of the round
table, the government was able to focus on the problem of security in emphasising its need for
ﬁnance, but it abandoned the ﬁne ﬁgure-based models of the MTEF. The opening chapter of
the report presented at the Round Table for Mauritania thus dealt with “geostrategic” issues,
calling on the countries present to show “international solidarity” and fulﬁl their duty to “help
each other” (Islamic Republic of Mauritania 2010, 10–15); an entire paper placed in the
dossier distributed to the round table’s participants was also devoted to this issue. So the rhetoric’s
seems to have changed, with the planning of development policies no longer being a priority, but
support for the security becoming the cornerstone of arguments for raising ﬁnance.
In the context that has prevailed in Mauritania, these factors were indeed critical in the posi-
tioning of international actors (Antil 2010). The willingness of foreign donors to support Aziz’s
regime was obvious. The round table itself ended with promises of tremendous support (3.2
billion dollars). But more generally, the cooperation agencies seem to have given Aziz’s
regime carte blanche. The delegation from the European Commission had made in 2010 budget-
ary aid a priority, even if assurances in relation to governance were worse than ever, and though
the same European Commission had always refused to grant budgetary aid for that very reason.
Furthermore, some knowledgeable observers let it be understood that IMF departments were
asked not to pay too much attention to Mauritania’s record in 2010/2011, because the country
was dealing with a tough security problem. If the international ﬁnancial institutions have been
generally lenient with the country in the past 15 years, this support went quite far. For
example, this was supposedly the cause for an unexpected resignation of an IMF country econ-
omist in 2010. And informers inside public bodies conﬁrmed that the Fund’s teams have indeed
proved less than meticulous in their enquiries, even in their methods of working with ﬁgures. So
the regime seems to be enjoying new margins for manoeuvre thanks to the “security rent”, which
in turn would have very concrete repercussions for the conduct of economic monitoring
activities.
Consultancy markets as a means of control
Another and last element supports my interpretation of the emergence of a new mode of govern-
ment. Under Aziz, many high-ranking ofﬁcials reputed to be competent have been bypassed on
the pretext of their involvement in the “bad management” of the past. But this argument is pri-
marily used to sideline particular people and maintain allegiances. As a result, many high-
ranking skilled ofﬁcials have sought refuge in consultancy work. It has indeed become common-
place to set up a consultancy and the market is ﬂourishing. Several factors suggest that today con-
sultancies occupy a space left vacant by the administration and that they have a stabilising role in
the interplay of networks in the political arena. In the ﬁeld of economics and statistics, some con-
sultancies, such as that of Sidna Ould N’dah, former head of the national statistical ofﬁce, and
Didi Ould Biye, also a former high ranking ofﬁcial in the administration, seem in fact to be exten-
sions of the administration. Sidna’s city centre consultancy is today the lair of “former managers”.
The vast premises, with its ofﬁces, internet connection and conference room, has become an
important meeting place. Sidna himself was one of Taya’s high ofﬁcials, ousted following the
coup d’état of 2005. Today his consultancy enables him to tender for work and coordinate
many different public activities, accumulating contracts with international organisations and
the state. Sidna still talks like a “director general”; he uses “we” when talking to ofﬁcials and
when describing what the government should do in the future. In a sense he has remained a
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director general, while also being a consultant. He is moreover an active member of the National
Pact for Development and Democracy – ADIL party, which includes many former top ofﬁcials
from the Taya period, having become allied with Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallah. After the putsch
of 2008, they did not support the seizure of power by Aziz and joined the National Front for
the Defence of Democracy (FNDD). However, since then they have moved closer to the presi-
dent, hoping to participate in public life. But Aziz, who claims to have broken with the former
chiefs, is very cautious in relation to this party. He ﬁnally included it in the presidential majority,
but his promises where appointments are concerned are barely kept. On the other hand, he has not
blocked them either. And while Sidna has not exactly been co-opted by those in power, nor has he
been left out; he has in a sense been put in reserve through the consultancy market, as have many
of his peers. To the contrary, those who formerly held posts of responsibility and have not fol-
lowed the desired political direction may be “ostracised” by being deprived of consultancy oppor-
tunities.17 This shows how the market can be used as a means of control to regulate the political
sphere. Today consultation is perhaps a way of recycling former elites and carrying out adminis-
trative work and, at the same time, in disciplinary terms, a way of keeping control over a section of
the population and Mauritania’s high-level technocrats by regulating their access to resources in a
clientelist system. It represents both the margins for manoeuvre in modern Mauritania and some
of the system’s ways of accommodating and attenuating what is often authoritarian domination.
But the price of all this is an ever-growing informalisation that proliferates around the formal pro-
cedures of economic management.18
Conclusion
I have described the transformations of the state in Mauritania in the period 2003–2011 by observ-
ing the concrete practices of economic policy management. I have proposed a reinterpretation of
Mauritania’s political trajectory. I have shown that under Taya’s regime, despite major deception
in relation to macro-economic ﬁgures revealed in 2004, calculation methods were structured
around international surveillance procedures and IMF methods, even if transgression was perva-
sive. While economic reality was largely indistinguishable, technical expertise went hand in hand
with deceit in concrete management practices, explaining how the ﬁction could arise. I also
showed that the existence of an expert elite is central to understanding Mauritanian power
relations at that time, and after. After Taya’s downfall, the regime that emerged from the demo-
cratic elections of 2007 represented a dramatic change, bringing the Mauritanian technocratic elite
into the limelight, enabling some technocratic achievements, like the Consultative group of
December 2007. But the coup d’état of August 2008 signiﬁed the failure of a technocratic enter-
prise that had fostered a ﬁction of successful transition and concealed some real issues of power.
Lastly, the current period has seen a reconﬁguration of administrative processes in which, against
the background of a serious degradation of working conditions, the authorities take advantage of
ﬂawed economic and ﬁnancial procedures to use new margins for manoeuvre and to reinforce the
atomised and clientelistic structure of the state, while adopting the moral high ground in the ﬁght
against rampant corruption. Therefore, it is possible to argue that the state, while managed in a
discretionary and authoritarian manner, is developing new forms of informalisation.
Some general points also emerge. My observations suggest that it is useful to study the formal
procedures of economic management in order to decode the way they structure power relations
within the state, and that such an analysis can be used to investigate political legitimacy. Such
observations are classical in Europe or America, following the seminal works of Theodore
Porter (1995) or Alain Desrosières (1998), but it is not the case in Africa. Some patterns
emerge, which should be confronted with other African cases to give a broader sociopolitical per-
spective on the economic ﬁctions in Africa (Samuel 2009; Jerven 2013, Hibou 2011a). For
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example, it appears that the existence of a technocratic ethos is not incompatible with massive
circumvention of the rules, nor even with power struggles. To the contrary, it reveals the coexis-
tence and accumulation within the state of different relationships to the economy, combining
trickery and technical expertise. Unlike most theories of neopatrimonial or failed states would
present it, technical competence can be a legitimate repertoire and to some extent condition
upward social mobility.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank the Centre d’Études et de Recherches Internationales (CERI, Sciences-Po Paris) and the
Fonds d’Analyse des Sociétés Politiques (FASOPO) who ﬁnanced my ﬁeldwork in Mauritania in 2011. This
article also draws on extensive personal experience in Mauritanian economic and ﬁnancial administrations
during 2003–2007.
Biographical note
Boris Samuel holds a PhD in political science from Sciences-Po Paris (2013), and a Master’s degree in econ-
omics and statistics from the École Nationale de la Statistique et de l’Administration Economique (ENSAE)
in Paris. He has worked for 10 years as an expert in statistics, public ﬁnance and macroeconomics for various
international organisations and governments in Africa. His research examines in detail technocratic practices
across Africa and the Caribbean, to provide a historicised analysis of modes of government and power
relations. Samuel is the General Secretary of the Fonds d’Analyse des Sociétés Politiques (FASOPO).
Notes
1. On the role of deceit and informality in Mauritania, see the work of Zekeria Ould Ahmed Salem (1999,
2001).
2. The monopoly was ﬁnally dismantled in 2006 under a strong pressure from the European Commission,
which regarded it as a hindrance to transport development.
3. See, of course, the seminal work by Jean-François Bayart on “the politics of the belly” (Bayart 2009).
See also the works on the neopatrimonial state, for example (Chabal and Daloz 1999) or analysis by
political economists (Van de Walle 2001; Hibou 2011a).
4. The article 11 of the Legal order of 25 July 1991 on freedom of the press.
5. A growing gap between the ofﬁcial and parallel rates of foreign currencies (that is, the rates on the
illegal market) is a sign of speculation and indicates that the country is running short of currencies.
6. According to a former Central Bank ofﬁcial, personal communication, Nouakchott, July 2011.
7. For an excellent analysis of the IMF’s methods from a social science perspective, see Richard Harper
(2007).
8. According to a former Central Bank ofﬁcial, personal communication, Nouakchott, April 2011
9. We can relate this with Jerven’s reﬂection on the “production boundary”, which shows the role of
methodological choices in building an economic narrative (Jerven 2013)
10. Many studies have shown this in non-African cases (Porter 1995; Desrosières 2003; Terray 2003).
11. Indonesia offered support with the production of models in 2006 in the frame of the Projet d’appui à la
gestion de l’énergie et du pétrole.
12. The MEMAU was created with the support of the German cooperation in the mid-1990s.
13. Until the year 2014, the Wikipedia page devoted to him has continuously mentioned these various
technocratic feats, notably in relation to modelling.
14. Many works have described the role of consultancy markets and ﬁrms in the reform of the state: for
example, on the United Kingdom (Power 1999) or France (Pierru and Henry 2012).
15. But part of the MAED rather than the Ministry of Education.
16. As in the case of the controversial ﬁshing contracts with the Chinese company Poly Hondone
(Quotidien de Nouakchott 2011b).
17. Personal communications, Nouakchott, January and April 2011.
18. On the link between “formalities” and “informalities”, see the seminal work of Michel de Certeau
(1984), and Hibou (2011b).
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